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Abstract
In his contribution, Mark Alfano lays out a new (to virtue theory) naturalistic 
way of determining what the virtues are, what it would take for them to be 
realized, and what it would take for them to be at least possible. This method 
is derived in large part from David Lewis’s development of Frank Ramsey’s 
method of implicit definition. The basic idea is to define a set of terms not 
individually but in tandem. This is accomplished by assembling all and only 
the common sense platitudes that involve them (e.g., typically, people want to 
be virtuous), conjoining those platitudes, and replacing the terms in ques-
tion by existentially quantified variables. If the resulting sentence is satisfied, 
then whatever satisfies are the virtues. If it isn’t satisfied, there are a couple of 
options. First, one could just admit defeat by saying that people can’t be virtu-
ous. More plausibly, one could weaken the conjunction by dropping a small 
number of the platitudes from it (and potentially adding some others). Alfano 
suggests that the most attractive way to do this is by dropping the platitudes 
that deal with cross- situational consistency and replacing them with platitudes 
that involve social construction: basically, people are virtuous (when they are) 
at least in part because other people signal their expectations of virtuous con-
duct, which induces virtuous conduct, which in turn induces further signals 
of expected virtuous conduct, and so on. In his response, James Montmarquet 
does not reject Alfano’s proposals regarding Ramsification as an analytical 
device, but does question whether Alfano’s own conception of moral char-
acter traits—whatever its empirical adequacy from the standpoint of social 
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science—does justice to our conception of moral responsibility. Because 
assignments of moral responsibility are so important, he suggests, we would 
like them and our closely related attributions of moral character to be clear, 
exact, and amenable to scientific treatment. From both the Tolstoyan and 
Humean perspectives he distinguishes, however, these assignments and attri-
butions are neither exact nor scientific, but more like an art form.
ramsifying Virtue theory
Mark Alfano
Can people be virtuous? This is a hard question, both because of its form and 
because of its content.
In terms of content, the proposition in question is at once normative and 
descriptive. Virtue- terms have empirical content. Attributions of virtues fig-
ure in the description, prediction, explanation, and control of behavior. If you 
know that someone is temperate, you can predict with some confidence that 
he won’t go on a bender this weekend. Someone’s investigating a mysterious 
phenomenon can be partly explained by (correctly) attributing curiosity to 
her. Character witnesses are called in trials to help determine how severely a 
convicted defendant will be punished. Virtue- terms also have normative con-
tent. Attributions of virtues are a manifestation of high regard and admiration; 
they are intrinsically rewarding to their targets; they’re a form of praise. The 
semantics of purely normative terms is hard enough on its own; the semantics 
of “thick” terms that have both normative and descriptive content is especially 
difficult.
Formally, the proposition in question (“people are virtuous”) is a generic, 
which adds a further wrinkle to its evaluation. It is notoriously difficult to give 
truth conditions for generics (Leslie 2008). A generic entails its existentially 
quantified counterpart, but is not entailed by it. For instance, tigers are four- 
legged, so some tigers are four- legged; but even though some deformed tigers 
are three- legged, it doesn’t follow that tigers are three- legged. A generic typi-
cally is entailed by its universally quantified counterpart, but does not entail 
it. Furthermore, a generic neither entails nor is entailed by its counterpart 
“most” statement. Tigers give live birth, but most tigers do not give live birth; 
after all, only about half of all tigers are female, and not all of them give birth. 
Most mosquitoes do not carry West Nile virus, but mosquitoes carry West Nile 
virus. Given the trickiness of generics, it’s helpful to clarify them to the extent 
possible with more precise non- generic statements.
Moreover, the proposition in question is modally qualified, which redou-
bles the difficulty of confirming or disconfirming it. What’s being asked is not 
simply whether people are virtuous, but whether they can be virtuous. It could 
6241-0711-005.indd   124 18-11-2014   9:24:33 PM
Can People Be Virtuous? • 125
turn out that even though no one is virtuous, it’s possible for people to become 
virtuous. This would, however, be extremely surprising. Unlike other unreal-
ized possibilities, virtue is almost universally sought after, so if it isn’t widely 
actualized despite all that seeking, we have fairly strong evidence that it’s not 
there to be had.
In this chapter, I propose a method for adjudicating the question whether 
people can be virtuous. This method, if sound, would help to resolve what’s 
come to be known as the situationist challenge to virtue theory, which over the 
last few decades has threatened both virtue ethics (Alfano 2011, 2013a; Doris 
2002; Harman 1999) and virtue epistemology (Alfano 2012 2013a, forthcom-
ing b; Olin & Doris 2014). The method is an application of David Lewis’s (1966, 
1970, 1972) development of Frank Ramsey’s (1931) approach to the implicit 
definition of theoretical terms. The method needs to be tweaked in various 
ways to handle the difficulties canvassed above, but, when it is, an interesting 
answer to our question emerges: we face a theoretical tradeoff between, on the 
one hand, insisting that virtue is a robust property of an individual agent that’s 
rarely attained and perhaps even unattainable and, on the other hand, allow-
ing that one person’s virtue might inhere partly in other people, making virtue 
at once more easily attained and more fragile.
The basic principle underlying the Ramsey- Lewis approach to implicit 
definition (often referred to as ‘Ramsification’) can be illustrated with a well- 
known story:
And the Lord sent Nathan unto David. And he came unto him, and said 
unto him, “There were two men in one city; the one rich, and the other 
poor. The rich man had exceeding many flocks and herds: But the poor 
man had nothing, save one little ewe lamb, which he had bought and 
nourished up: and it grew up together with him, and with his children; it 
did eat of his own meat, and drank of his own cup, and lay in his bosom, 
and was unto him as a daughter. And there came a traveler unto the rich 
man, and he spared to take of his own flock and of his own herd, to dress 
for the wayfaring man that was come unto him; but took the poor man’s 
lamb, and dressed it for the man that was come to him.” And David’s 
anger was greatly kindled against the man; and he said to Nathan, “As the 
Lord liveth, the man that hath done this thing shall surely die: And 
he shall restore the lamb fourfold, because he did this thing, and because 
he had no pity.” And Nathan said to David, “Thou art the man.”
Nathan uses Ramsification to drive home a point. He tells a story about an 
ordered triple of objects (two people and an animal) that are interrelated in 
various ways. Some of the first object’s properties (e.g., wealth) are monadic; 
some of the second object’s properties (e.g., poverty) are monadic; some of the 
first object’s properties are relational (e.g., he steals the third object from the 
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second object); some of the second object’s properties are relational (e.g., the 
third object is stolen from him by the first object); and so on. Even though the 
first object is not explicitly defined as the X such that . . . , it is nevertheless 
implicitly defined as the first element of the ordered triple such that . . . The big 
reveal happens when Nathan announces that the first element of the ordered 
triple, about whom his interlocutor has already made some pretty serious 
pronouncements, is the very person he’s addressing (the other two, for those 
unfamiliar with the 2nd Samuel 12, are Uriah and Bathsheba1).
The story is Biblical, but the method is modern. To implicitly define a set of 
theoretical terms (henceforth ‘T- terms’), one formulates a theory T in those 
terms and any other terms (henceforth ‘O- terms’) one already understands 
or has an independent theory of. Next, one writes T as a single sentence, 
such as a long conjunction, in which the T- terms t
1
. . . , t
n
 occur (henceforth 
‘T[t
1
. . . , t
n
]’ or ‘the postulate of T’). The T- terms are replaced by unbound var-
iables x
1
. . . , x
n
, and then existentially quantified over to generate the Ramsey 
sentence of T, ∃x
1




,. . . ,x
n
], which states that T is realized, that is, that 
there are objects x
1
. . . , x
n
 that satisfy the Ramsey sentence. An ordered n- tuple 
that satisfies the Ramsey sentence is then said to be a realizer of the theory.
Lewis (1966) famously applied this method to folk psychology to argue 
for the mind- brain identity theory. Somewhat roughly, he argued that folk 
psychology can be treated as a theory in which mental- state terms are the 
T- terms. The postulate of folk psychology is identified as the conjunction of 
all folk- psychological platitudes (commonsense psychological truths that eve-
ryone knows, and everyone knows that everyone knows, and everyone knows 
that everyone knows that everyone knows, and so on). The Ramsey sentence 
of folk psychology is formed in the usual way, by replacing all mental- state 
terms (e.g., ‘belief,’ ‘desire,’ ‘pain,’ etc.) with variables and existentially quan-
tifying over those variables. Finally, one goes on to determine what, in the 
actual world, satisfies the Ramsey sentence; that is, one investigates what, if 
anything, is a realizer of the Ramsey sentence. If there is a realizer, then that’s 
what the T- terms refer to; if there is no realizer, then the T- terms do not refer. 
Lewis claims that brain states are such realizers, and hence that mental states 
are identical with brain states.
Lewis’s Ramsification method is attractive for a number of reasons.2 First, 
it ensures that we don’t simply change the topic when we try to give a philo-
sophical account of some phenomenon. If your account of the mind is wildly 
inconsistent with the postulate of folk psychology, then—though you may be 
giving an account of something interesting—you’re not doing what you think 
you’re doing. Second, enables us to distinguish between the meaning of the 
T- terms and whether they refer. The T- terms mean what they would refer to, 
if there were such a thing. Whether they in fact refer is a distinct question. 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, Ramsification is holistic. The first half 
of the twentieth century bore witness to the fact that it’s impossible to give an 
6241-0711-005.indd   126 18-11-2014   9:24:33 PM
Can People Be Virtuous? • 127
independent account of almost any psychological phenomenon (belief, desire, 
emotion, perception) because what it means to have one belief is essentially 
bound up with what it means to have a whole host of other beliefs, as well 
as (at least potentially) a whole host of desires, emotions, and perceptions. 
 Ramsification gets around this problem by giving an account of all of the 
 relevant phenomena at once, rather than trying to chip away at them piecemeal.
Virtue theory stands to benefit from the application of Ramsification for 
all of these reasons. We want an account of virtue, not an account of some 
other interesting phenomenon (though we might want that too). We want an 
account that recognizes that talk of virtue is meaningful, even if there aren’t 
virtues. Most importantly, we want an account of virtue that recognizes the 
complexity of virtue and character—the fact that virtues are interrelated in a 
whole host of ways with occurrent and dispositional mental states, with other 
virtues, with character more broadly, and so on.
Whether Lewis is right about brains is irrelevant to our question, but his 
methodology is crucial. What I want to do now is to show how the same 
method, suitably modified, can be used to implicitly define virtue- terms, which 
in turn will help us to answer the question whether people can be virtuous. For 
reasons that will become clear as we proceed, the T- terms of virtue theory as 
I construe it here are ‘person,’ ‘virtue,’ ‘vice,’ the names of the various virtues 
(e.g., ‘courage,’ ‘generosity,’ ‘curiosity’), the names of their congruent affects 
(e.g., ‘feeling courageous,’ ‘feeling generous,’ ‘feeling curious’), the names of the 
various vices (e.g., ‘cowardice,’ ‘greed,’ ‘intellectual laziness’), and the names of 
their congruent affects, (e.g., ‘feeling cowardly,’ ‘feeling greedy,’ ‘feeling intellec-
tually lazy’). The O- terms are all other terms, importantly including terms that 
refer to attitudes (e.g., ‘belief,’ ‘desire,’ ‘anger,’ ‘resentment,’ ‘disgust,’ ‘contempt,’ 
‘respect’), mental processes (e.g., ‘deliberation’), perceptions and perceptual 
sensitivities, behaviors, reasons, situational features (e.g., ‘being alone,’ ‘being 
in a crowd,’ ‘being monitored’), and evaluations (e.g., ‘praise’ and ‘blame’).
Elsewhere (Alfano 2013a), I have argued for an intuitive distinction between 
high- fidelity and low- fidelity virtues. High- fidelity virtues, such as honesty, 
chastity, and loyalty, require near- perfect manifestation in undisrupted condi-
tions. Someone only counts as chaste if he never cheats on his partner when 
cheating is a temptation. Low- fidelity virtues, such as generosity, tact, and 
tenacity, are not so demanding. Someone might count as generous if she were 
more disposed to give than not to give when there was sufficient reason to do 
so; someone might count as tenacious if she were more disposed to persist 
than not to persist in the face of adversity. If this is on the right track, the 
postulate of virtue theory will recognize the distinction. For instance, it seems 
to me at least that almost everyone would say that helpfulness is a low- fidelity 
virtue whereas loyalty is a high- fidelity virtue. Here, then, are some families 
of platitudes about character that are candidates for the postulate of virtue 
theory:
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(A) The Virtue/Affect Family
 (a
1
)  If a person has courage, then she will typically feel courageous 
when there is sufficient reason to do so.
 (a
2
)  If a person has generosity, then she will typically feel generous 
when there is sufficient reason to do so.
 (a
3
)  If a person has curiosity, then she will typically feel curious when 




) . . . .
(C) The Virtue/Cognition Family
 (c
1




)  If a person has courage, then she will typically deliberate well 
about how to overcome threats and reliably form beliefs about 




) . . . .
(S) The Virtue/Situation Family3
 (s
1
)  If a person has courage, then she will typically be unaffected by 




)  If a person has generosity, then she will typically be unaffected by 
situational factors that are neither reasons for nor reasons against 
giving resources to someone.
 (s
3
)  If a person has curiosity, then she will typically be unaffected by 






(E) The Virtue/Evaluation Family
 (e
1
)  If a person has courage, then she will typically react to threats in 
ways that merit praise.
 (e
2
)  If a person has generosity, then she will typically react to others’ 
needs and wants in ways that merit praise.
 (e
3
)  If a person has curiosity, then she will typically react to intellec-





(B) The Virtue/Behavior Family
 (b
1
)  If a person has courage, then she will typically act so as to over-
come threats when there is sufficient reason to do so.
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 (b
2
)  If a person has generosity, then she will typically act so as to ben-
efit another person when there is sufficient reason to do so.
 (b
3
)  If a person has curiosity, then she will typically act so as to solve 





(P) The Virtue Prevalence Family
 (p
1
) Many people commit acts of courage.
 (p
2
) Many people commit acts of generosity.
 (p
3
) Many people commit acts of curiosity.
 (p
4
) Many people are courageous.
 (p
5
) Many people are generous.
 (p
6





(I) The Cardinality/Integration Family
 (i
1
) Typically, a person who has modesty also has humility.
 (i
2
) Typically, a person who has magnanimity also has generosity.
 (i
3





(D) The Desire/Virtue Family
 (d
1
) Typically, a person desires to have courage.
 (d
2
) Typically, a person desires to have generosity.
 (d
3





(F) The Fidelity Family
 (f
1
) Chastity is high- fidelity.
 (f
2
) Honesty is high- fidelity.
 (f
3





Each platitude in each family is meant to be merely illustrative. Presum-
ably they could all be improved somewhat, and there are many more such 
platitudes. Moreover, each family is itself just an example. There are many 
further families describing the relations among vice, affect, cognition, situa-
tion, evaluation, and behavior, as well as families that make three- way rather 
than two- way connections (e.g., “If a person is courageous, then she will typi-
cally act so as to overcome threats when there is sufficient reason to do so and 
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because she feels courageous.”). For the sake of simplicity, though, let’s assume 
that the families identified above contain all and only the platitudes relevant to 
the implicit definition of virtues. Ramsification can now be performed in the 
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(henceforth, simply the ‘postulate of virtue theory’). Next, replace each of the 
T- terms in the postulate of virtue theory with an unbound variable, then exis-
tentially quantifies over those variables to generate the Ramsey sentence of 
virtue theory. Finally, check whether the Ramsey sentence of virtue theory is 
true and—if it is—what its realizers are.
After this preliminary work has been done, we’re in a position to see more 
clearly the problem raised by the situationist challenge to virtue theory. Situ-
ationists argue that there is no realizer of the Ramsey sentence of virtue theory. 
Moreover, this is not for lack of effort. Indeed, one family of platitudes in the 
Ramsey sentence specifically states that, typically, people desire to be virtuous; 
it’s not as if no one has yet tried to be or become courageous, generous, or 
curious.4 In this chapter, I don’t have space to canvass the relevant empirical 
evidence; interested readers should see my (2013a and 2013b). Nevertheless, 
the crucial claim—that the Ramsey sentence of virtue theory is not realized—
is not an object of serious dispute in the philosophical literature.
One very common response to the situationist challenge from defenders of 
virtue theory (and virtue ethics in particular) is to claim that virtues are actu-
ally quite rare, directly contradicting the statements in the virtue prevalence 
family. I do not think this is the best response to the problem, as I explain 
below, but the point remains that all serious disputants agree that the Ramsey 
sentence is not realized.
As described above, Ramsification looks like a simple, formal exercise. Col-
lect the platitudes, put them into a big conjunction, perform the appropriate 
substitutions, existentially quantify, and check the truth- value of the resulting 
Ramsey sentence (and the referents of its bound variables, if any). But there 
are several opportunities for a critic to object as the exercise unfolds.
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One difficulty that arises for some families, such as the desire/virtue fam-
ily, is that they involve T- terms within the scope of intentional attitude verbs.5 
Since existential quantification into such contexts is blocked by opacity, such 
families cannot be relied on to define the T- terms, though they can be used 
to double- check the validity of the implicit definition once the T- terms are 
defined.6
Another difficulty is that this methodology presupposes that we have an 
adequate understanding of the O- terms, which in this case include terms 
that refer to attitudes, mental processes, perceptions and perceptual sensi-
tivities, behaviors, reasons, situational features, and evaluations. One might 
be dubious about this presupposition. I certainly am. However, the fact that 
philosophy of mind and metaethics are works- in- progress should not be 
interpreted as a problem specifically for my approach to virtue theory. Any 
normative theory that relies on other branches of philosophy to figure out 
what mental states and processes are, and what reasons are, can be criticized 
in the same way.
A third worry is that the list of platitudes contains gaps (e.g., a virtue acqui-
sition family about how various traits are acquired). Conversely, one might 
think that it has gluts (e.g., unmotivated commitment to virtue prevalence). 
To overcome this pair of worries, we need a way of determining what the plati-
tudes are. Perhaps surprisingly, there is no precedent for this in the philosophy 
of mind, despite the fact that Ramsification is often invoked as a framework 
there.7 This may be because it’s supposed to be obvious what the platitudes are. 
Here’s Frank Jackson’s flippant response to the worry:
I am sometimes asked—in a tone that suggests that the question is a 
major objection—why, if conceptual analysis is concerned to elucidate 
what governs our classificatory practice, don’t I advocate doing serious 
opinion polls on people’s responses to various cases? My answer is that 
I do—when it is necessary. Everyone who presents the Gettier cases to a 
class of students is doing their own bit of fieldwork, and we all know the 
answer they get in the vast majority of cases. (1998, pp. 36–37)
After all, according to Lewis, everyone knows the platitudes, and everyone 
knows that everyone knows them, and everyone knows that everyone knows 
that everyone knows them, and so on. Sometimes, however, the most obvious 
things are the hardest to spot. It thus behooves us to at least sketch a method 
for carrying out the first step of Ramsification: identifying the platitudes. Call 
this pre- Ramsification.
Here’s an attempt at spelling out how pre- Ramsification should work: start 
by listing off a large number of candidate platitudes. These can be all of the 
statements one would, in a less- responsible, Jacksonian mood, have merely 
asserted were platitudes. It can also include statements that seem highly likely 
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but perhaps not quite platitudes. Add to the pool of statements some that seem, 
intuitively, to be controversial, as well as some that seem obviously false; these 
serve as anchors in the ensuing investigation. Next, collect people’s responses 
to these statements. Several sorts of responses would be useful, including sub-
jective agreement, social agreement, and reaction time. For instance, prompt 
people with the statement, “Many people are honest,” and ask to what extent 
they agree and to what extent they think others would agree. Measure their 
reaction times as they answer both questions. High subjective and social agree-
ment, paired with fast reaction times, is strong but defeasible evidence that a 
statement is a platitude. This is a bit vague, since I haven’t specified what counts 
as “high” agreement or “fast” reaction times, but there are precedents in psy-
chology for setting these thresholds. Moreover, this kind of pre- Ramsification 
wouldn’t establish dispositively what the platitudes are, but then, dispositive 
proof only happens in mathematics.
It’s far beyond the scope of this short chapter to show that pre- Ramsification 
works in the way I suggest, or that it verifies all and only the families identified 
above. For now, let’s suppose that it does, that is, that all of the families pro-
posed above were validated by pre- Ramsification. Let’s also suppose that we 
have strong evidence that the Ramsey sentence of virtue theory is not realized 
(a point that, as I mentioned above, is not seriously contested). How should 
we then proceed?
Lewis foresaw that, in some cases, the Ramsey sentence for a given field 
would be unrealized, so he built in a way of fudging things: instead of gener-
ating the postulate by taking the conjunction of all of the platitudes, one can 
generate a weaker postulate by taking the disjunction of each of the conjunc-
tions of most of the platitudes. For example, if there were only five platitudes, 
p, q, r, s, and t, then instead of the postulate’s being p ∧ q ∧ r ∧ s ∧ t, it would 
be (p ∧ q ∧ r ∧ s) ∨ (p ∧ q ∧ r ∧ t) ∨ . . . ∨ (q ∧ r ∧ s ∧ t). In the case of virtue 
theory, we could take the disjunction of each of the conjunctions of all but 
one of the families of platitudes. Alternatively, we could exclude a few of the 
platitudes from within each family.
Fudging in this way makes it easier for the Ramsey sentence to be real-
ized, since the disjunction of conjunctions of most of the platitudes is logically 
weaker than the straightforward conjunction of all of them. Fudging may 
end up making it too easy, though, such that there are multiple realizers of the 
Ramsey sentence. When this happens, it’s up to the theorist to figure out how 
to strengthen things back up in such a way that there is a unique realizer.
The various responses to the situationist challenge can be seen as different 
ways of doing this. Everyone recognizes that the un- fudged Ramsey sentence 
of virtue theory is unrealized. But a sufficiently fudged Ramsey sentence is 
bound to be multiply realized. It’s a theoretical choice exactly how to play 
things at this point. More traditional virtue theorists such as Joel Kupperman 
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(2009) favor a fudged version of the Ramsey sentence wherein the virtue 
prevalence family has been dropped. John Doris (2002) favors a fudged ver-
sion wherein the virtue/situation and virtue/integration families have been 
dropped. I (2013a, 2014a) favor a fudged version wherein the virtue/situation 
family has been dropped and a virtue/social construction family has been 
added in its place. The statements in the latter family have to do with the ways 
in which (signals of) social expectations implicitly and explicitly influence 
behavior. The main idea is that having a virtue is more like having a title or 
social role (e.g., you’re curious because people signal to you their expecta-
tions of curiosity) than like having a basic physical or biological property 
(e.g., being over six feet tall). Christian Miller (2013, 2014) drops the virtue 
prevalence family and adds a mixed- trait prevalence family in its place, which 
states that many people possess traits that are neither virtues nor vices, such 
as the disposition to help others in order to improve one’s mood or avoid 
sliding into a bad mood.
In this short chapter, I don’t have the space to argue against all alternatives 
to my own proposal. Instead, I want to make two main claims. First, the “virtue 
is rare” dodge advocated by Kupperman and others who drop the virtue prev-
alence family has costs associated with it. Second, those costs may be steeper 
than the costs associated with my own way of responding to the situationist 
challenge.
Researchers in personality and social psychology have documented for 
decades the tendency of just about everybody to make spontaneous trait infer-
ences, attributing robust character traits on the basis of scant evidence (Ross 
1977; Uleman et al. 1996). This indicates that people think that character 
traits (virtues, vices, and neutral traits, such as extroversion) are prevalent. 
Zagzebski (1996) concurs, making the somewhat wide- eyed claim that “many 
of us have known persons whose goodness shines forth from the depths 
of their being” (p. 83). Furthermore, in a forthcoming paper (Alfano et al., 
 forthcoming), I show that the vast majority of obituaries attribute multiple 
virtues to the deceased. Not everyone is eulogized in an obituary, of course, 
but most are (about 55% of Americans, by my calculations). Not all obituar-
ies are sincere, but presumably many are. Absent reason to think that people 
about whom obituaries differ greatly from people about whom they are not 
written, we can treat this as evidence that most people think that the peo-
ple they know have multiple virtues. But of course, if most relations of most 
people are virtuous, it follows that most people are virtuous. In other words, 
the virtue- prevalence family is deeply ingrained in folk psychology and folk 
morality.
Social psychologists think that people are quick to attribute virtues. My 
own work on obituaries suggests the same. What do philosophers say? Though 
there are some (Russell 2009) who claim that virtue is rare or even non- existent 
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with a shrug, this is not the predominant opinion. Alasdair MacIntyre (1984) 
claims that “without allusion to the place that justice and injustice, cour-
age and cowardice play in human life very little will be genuinely explicable” 
(p. 199). Philippa Foot (2001), following Peter Geach (1977), argues that cer-
tain generic statements characterize the human form of life, and that from 
these generic statements we can infer what humans need and hence will typi-
cally have. For the sake of comparison, consider what she says about a different 
life form, the deer. Foot first points out that the deer’s form of defense is flight. 
Next, she claims that a certain normative statement follows, namely, that deer 
are naturally or by nature swift. This is not to say that every deer is swift; some 
are slow. Instead, it’s a generic statement that characterizes the nature of the 
deer. Finally, she says that any deer that fails to be swift—that fails to live up to 
its nature—is “so far forth defective” (p. 34). The same line of reasoning that 
she here applies to non- human animals is meant to apply to human animals 
as well. As she puts it,
Men and women need to be industrious and tenacious of purpose not 
only so as to be able to house, clothe, and feed themselves, but also to 
pursue human ends having to do with love and friendship. They need 
the ability to form family ties, friendships, and special relations with 
neighbors. They also need codes of conduct. And how could they have 
all these things without virtues such as loyalty, fairness, kindness, and in 
certain circumstances obedience? (pp. 44–45, emphasis mine)
In light of these sorts of claims, let’s consider again the defense offered by 
some virtue ethicists that virtue is rare, or even impossible to achieve. If vir-
tues are what humans need, but the vast majority of people don’t have them, 
one would have thought that our species would have died out long ago. Con-
sider the analogous claim for deer: although deer need to be swift, the vast 
majority of deer are galumphers. Were that the case, presumably they’d be 
hunted down and devoured like a bunch of tasty venison treats. Or consider 
another example of Foot’s: she agrees with Geach (1977) that people need 
virtues like honeybees need stingers. Does it make sense for someone with 
this  attitude to say that most people lack virtues? That would be like saying 
that, even though bees need stingers, most lack stingers. It’s certainly odd 
to claim that the majority—even the vast majority of a species fails to ful-
fill its own nature. That’s not a contradiction, but it is a cost to be borne by 
anyone who responds to the situationist challenge by dropping the virtue 
prevalence family.
One might respond on Foot’s behalf that human animals are special: unlike 
the other species, we have natures that are typically unfulfilled. That would be 
an interesting claim to make, but I am not aware of anyone who has defended 
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it in print.8 I conclude, then, that dropping the virtue prevalence family is a 
significant cost to revising the postulate.
But is it a more significant cost than the one imposed on me by replacing 
the virtue/situation family with a virtue/social construction family? I think it 
is. This comparative claim is of course hard to adjudicate, so I will rest content 
merely to emphasize the strength of the virtue/prevalence family.
What would it look like to fudge things in the way I recommend? Essen-
tially, one would end up committed to a version of the hypothesis of extended 
cognition, a variety of active externalism in the family of the extended mind 
hypothesis. Clark and Chalmers (1998) argued that the vehicles (not just the 
contents) of some mental states and processes extend beyond the nervous 
system and even the skin of the agent whose states they are.9 If my arguments 
are on the right track, virtues and vices sometimes extend in the same way: 
the bearers of someone’s moral and intellectual virtues sometimes include 
asocial aspects of the environment and (more frequently) other people’s nor-
mative and descriptive expectations. What it takes (among other things) for 
you to be, for instance, open- minded, on this view is that others think of you 
as open- minded and signal those thoughts to you. When they do, they prompt 
you to revise your self- concept, to want to live up to their expectations, to 
expect them to reward open- mindedness and punish closed- mindedness, to 
reciprocate displays of open- mindedness, and so on. These are all induce-
ments to conduct yourself in an open- minded way, which they will typically 
notice. When they do, their initial attribution will be corroborated, lead-
ing them to strengthen their commitment to it and perhaps to signal that 
strengthening to you, which in turn is likely to further induce you to conduct 
yourself in open- minded ways, which will again corroborate their judgment 
of you, and so on. Such feedback loops are, on my view, partly constitutive of 
what it means to have a virtue.10 The realizer of the fudged Ramsey sentence 
isn’t just what’s inside the person who has the virtue but also further things 
outside that person.
So, can people be virtuous? I hope it isn’t too disappointing to answer with, 
“It depends on what you mean by ‘can,’ ‘people,’ and ‘virtuous.’” If we’re con-
cerned only with abstract possibility, perhaps the answer is affirmative. If we are 
concerned more with the proximal possibility that figures in people’s current 
deliberations, plans, and hopes, we have reason to worry. If we only care whether 
more than zero people can be virtuous, the existing, statistical, empirical evi-
dence is pretty much useless. If we instead treat ‘people’ as a generic referring to 
human animals (perhaps a majority of them, but at least a substantial plural-
ity), such evidence becomes both important and (again) worrisome. If we insist 
that being virtuous is something that must inhere entirely within the agent who 
has the virtue, then evidence from social psychology is damning. If instead we 
allow for the possibility of external character, there is room for hope.11
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ramsify (by all Means)—but Do Not  
‘Dumb Down’ the Moral Virtues
James Montmarquet
the Basic Challenge of Situationist research
In a number of important publications, Mark Alfano has refined a basically 
naturalist approach to the theory of moral and epistemic character, attempt-
ing to understand these in terms of established research findings in the social 
sciences.12 In this general endeavor, of course, he is not alone. The dominant 
(“pragmatist”) strain of philosophy in America has long rejected any strict 
dichotomy of nature and value—or of ethics and the social and natural sci-
ences. I will turn to Alfano’s contributions specifically to this volume in due 
course. But first it may prove instructive to probe, in somewhat more gen-
eral terms, the kind of broadly naturalist approach to moral character he 
would advocate, confronting it, where possible, with what seems a viable 
alternative—not supernaturalism, mind you, but an approach emphasiz-
ing the independence and autonomy of moral philosophy, and insisting that 
our judgments of moral responsibility are too important to be left to social 
 scientists—or maybe philosophers.
With Plato and Aristotle, let us observe, moral philosophy had begun to 
display this very autonomy and independence relative both to religion and 
to natural science—even if in the latter case this was mainly because natural 
science had hardly begun to break free of philosophy. In fact, we have a remark-
able intimation of this breakthrough in Socrates’ evidently autobiographical 
discourse in the Phaedo (98b- e). Having been as a young man impressed with 
the physical sciences, he relates how he later came to learn of the insufficiency 
of their explanations: Why am I sitting here in prison, he asks, awaiting death? 
Is it because my muscles, bones, and nerves have arranged themselves in these 
ways—or is it not because I am committed to certain values, for which com-
mitment I freely take responsibility and am willing to die?
In the centuries to follow, challenges to moral philosophy’s autonomy 
have come mainly from the sciences: with each great name in this history 
(Newton, Darwin, Freud, Einstein), a potential challenge is there, mainly ema-
nating from those enthusiasts, inside or outside of philosophy, who would 
apply the lessons of the new science to ‘old moral thinking.’ On the whole, 
it must be said, moral philosophy has withstood these—though with some 
pretty good battle scars. But now we come to the latest challenge: many experi-
mental results in social sciences appear to question the very idea—so basic to 
a broadly Aristotelian approach to ethics and to much of our ordinary moral 
thinking about ourselves and others—of individuals as possessed of, and hav-
ing their actions considerably shaped by, moral character. According to these 
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results, our actions are, to an unexpected extent, the products of the “situ-
ation” in which we find ourselves, and not of distinctive qualities of “moral 
character.”13 The findings in question are broadly of two kinds:
I. There are ones tending to show that a given situational variable has unex-
pectedly powerful and largely uniform effects—that is, effects holding largely 
irrespective of any differences in “moral character” as might have been sup-
posed to exist within the group exposed to this influence.14
II. There are also findings tending to show that as one varies a  situation—but 
within the confines of what we would take to be a single trait (e.g., honesty), 
we do not find very much individual consistency. 15 Thus, cheating in one type 
of educational setting (say, copying another’s answers) turns out to be a sur-
prisingly poor predictor of one’s cheating in another (say, working past a time 
deadline).
Such contentions have, to say the least, sparked a lively debate, in which the 
defenders of traditional virtue ethics have scored their fair share of points.16 
But let me now put my own cards—some of them, those that do not remain 
up my sleeve—on the table. The situationist’s starting point is certain empiri-
cal findings and her creed is largely that of “scientific naturalism”: roughly, 
the idea that the findings and methodology of empirical science should be 
our best guide not just to the nature of the physical universe but in questions 
of philosophy (of metaphysics and of morality) as well. My starting point, by 
contrast, is neither science nor a dogmatic adherence to any particular moral 
outlook or philosophical persuasion; instead I look, initially at least, to the 
considered moral judgments we make especially concerning moral respon-
sibility (of praise and even more so of blame). Since these judgments are so 
important, we would like them to be informed by the best, by the most rigor-
ous findings science has to offer; and since questions of moral character are 
so deeply implicated in these judgments, we would naturally like this science 
to apply to them. The problem is that insofar as character can be reined in, 
domesticated and made scientifically serviceable, its most important moral 
dimensions still have a way of roaming free.
Aristotle’s Mixed Legacy
Having indicated the importance I place on the connection between character 
and responsibility, I immediately yield pride of place briefly to Aristotle, whose 
ethical theory links praiseworthy and blameworthy conduct to virtuous or 
vicious dispositions of the agent (Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. II, iv- v). Aristotle, 
however, is also a convenient target for situationists, when he maintains that 
the virtuous act must reflect a “firm and unchangeable character” (Bk. II, iv). 
So, for instance, in his early and rather uncompromising statement of situ-
ationism, Harman (1999, p. 317) glosses Aristotle’s notion of a character trait 
as a “relatively long- term stable disposition to act in distinctive ways,” then 
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proceeds to argue, along the situationist lines sketched earlier, that no such 
disposition exists.
Now, Aristotle’s idea, sympathetically stated, would seem to be this. If an act 
does not express the right kind of disposition (inner state), even if it succeeds 
in being the right thing to do, this reflects a kind of luck; just the right non- 
virtuous factors have helped out. If, however, an act does reflect a virtuous inner 
state, this state will be of sufficient power and stability as to be  repeatable—not 
just in situations narrowly of that type, but across a greater variety.
Arguably, however, this stance involves—not entirely (as we shall see) but in 
some measure—a “false dichotomy”: arguably, that is to say, we need to recog-
nize a three- , and not merely a two- fold distinction in this connection. There 
is such (superficially) good conduct as may result (1) from not much inner 
virtue at all, conduct that rightly nets faint praise and that is no very good 
candidate to be repeated. There is good conduct resulting, as Aristotle would 
wish, from (2) the stable possession of a virtuous (inner) trait. Finally, there is 
also good conduct resulting from (3) what may be an equally potent, but rela-
tively unstable, expression of such traits. By analogy: there shots of pure luck 
by “duffers” in golf; there are shots displaying an excellent, repeatable swing; 
and there are shots of equal grace and panache pulled off by somewhat erratic 
young golfers whose swings are not yet consistently good (“grooved”).
Of course, there is a kind of “luck” involved in type (3) cases; but this, it also 
must be pointed out, is not the luck of mere “good fortune.” It is good fortune 
when the duffer’s shot hits a rock and bounds out of the hazard, two inches 
from the pin; and when the coward’s act starts a general retreat that ends up 
saving the army. An act, however, of unusual heroism—performed by a for-
merly, or just a sometime, very timid soldier—would have been unpredictable, 
but is not mere good fortune or normally to be described as “mere luck.” In fact, 
this distinction between type (2) and type (3) supports and larger and more 
significant difference. It is part of the idea of character that it can improve—or 
worsen—based on what happens in a given case. When this happens, we can 
in no way judge the moral quality of that display of character according to the 
overall character we suppose this individual to have (or to have had). In the 
familiar story of The Red Badge of Courage,17 Henry ends up displaying a quality 
of courage that would have to be heavily, and counter- intuitively, discounted if 
it were assessed so as to give equal weight to his past cowardice. People grow; 
people change. As Aristotle himself must recognize, nothing augments one’s 
courage like courage (greater than one’s average level to that point): not just 
doing unusually courageous deeds but with a new inner strength.
tolstoy and hume
Our opening discussion has pointed in the direction of a character- based 
approach to moral responsibility, but emphasizing—what Aristotle does 
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not—the distinction between the praiseworthiness or blameworthiness 
of a given character exemplification (this courage of Henry’s) and that 
agent’s conduct measured over time (Henry’s typical level of courage). To 
this opening, we now add two contrasting (but not incompatible) lines of 
thought:
(1) The Tolstoyan Idea. Character is not well revealed most of the time, but 
is so in certain especially suitable, often quite difficult, situations. I associate 
this idea with Tolstoy, as his fiction displays this author’s remarkable gift for 
revealing character by the apt selection of situation and response. Such situ-
ations are of an especially challenging nature: to name but one, there is the 
life- threatening blizzard in his story, Master and Man and the quite different 
responses to it of the rich merchant and his servant.18 From this standpoint, 
cases in which it is “easy to be honest” (or where the Russian winter is merely 
“a bit cold”) are hardly worth bothering about; for even if an agent should fail 
in one of these, this is typically a sign not of amazingly bad character so much 
as that more is going on than meets the eye.
(2) Humean Intelligibility. Even though Hume famously said, we must 
judge another’s conduct not by his acts, which are “temporary and perish-
ing” but by something “durable [and] constant” in his nature—that is, traits 
of moral character19—this does not mean that he must deny that assess-
ments of praise and blame will properly take into consideration differences 
of situation. Thus, suppose that some English gentleman, known to be scru-
pulously honest in his business dealings, has been exposed as lying, on a 
given occasion, to a prostitute. We have found out something new and per-
haps a little surprising about him. The Humean point, however, is not just to 
add this new information on—as though to say, seemingly with Doris, that 
the man has “business honesty” and “prostitute” (or, if we dare to generalize, 
“sexual”) dishonesty, but to begin to form some revised but still unified pic-
ture of “who this man is.”20 We must add, however, that achieving this fuller 
picture—not just of ‘who he is in general’ but ‘who he has shown himself 
to be in this case’—is strictly an art, not a science. Those with a penetrating 
insight into the true moral significance of a given human act (what it truly 
displays of that agent) are more like a Rembrandt or some other great por-
traitist than a Newton or an Einstein.
Now both the Tolstoyan and the Humean viewpoints, let us observe, remain 
broadly ‘Aristotelian’ in two basic regards:
First, in recognizing that the implications of any given character attribu-
tion extend beyond the present act, both would recognize, with Aristotle, 
the dispositional character of character attributions. Both seek some dis-
covery or understanding of morally ‘who one is’—not in general but so far 
as this is revealed in the present action. But any such judgment must carry 
 implications—tentative and inexact as these may be—for future acts. Thomas 
Hurka (2006) has remarked, with some justice, that if you see someone
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kick a dog from an evident desire to hurt the dog just for the pleasure of 
doing so. Do you say, ‘That was a vicious act’ or ‘That was a vicious act on 
the condition that it issued from a stable disposition to give similar kicks 
in similar circumstances’? Surely you say the former. (p. 71)
At a minimum, however, such a display—supposing, with Hurka, that it 
was of genuine (and not merely apparent) viciousness—would have some 
implications, however inexact, regarding future displays. We have found out 
something, something rather unpleasant, about this agent. As long as he is 
around, we must worry that his viciousness may be around as well. Pace Hurka, 
we do not have to make a prior or an independent discovery of a continuing 
trait in order to attribute something that would carry implications, to a greater 
or lesser degree, to that effect. If I see someone lift three hundred pounds, I can 
call him “strong” without further ado; but again this has implications.
Second, neither point of view rejects the Aristotelian notion that a virtu-
ous act must display some suitable connection to one’s past character displays. 
In fact, both will say this of any act for which one has moral responsibility. 
As in the previous example of the Victorian gentleman, the Humean por-
trait employs shades often drawn from a past understanding of this agent. 
It is a composite of past and present. For his part, once the challenge of the 
situation has been met (or not met) Tolstoy will equally want us to under-
stand ‘who this person has shown himself to be’—not in abstraction from 
the past, but in the present case, using the past to help us understand its 
meaning. Thus, in another story of his (“Father Sergius”21), a proud man 
passes through a whole series of failures—cadet of the Imperial Guard, 
suitor, monk, hermit, vagabond—until finally discovering true pride from 
one possessed of none of his advantages. Little in what happens could have 
been predicted, but all of it needs to be comprehended under the aspect of 
his pride and his past.
For both points of view, then, one needs to recognize links to the past 
and implications regarding the future—neither of which, it is important to 
emphasize at this point, are altogether satisfactory from a rigorously scientific 
standpoint. We draw on the past, in a selective, hopefully insightful way, to 
paint—in what is becoming my central metaphor—a picture of the present, 
a picture whose implications are in some ways profound, but still profoundly 
inexact. Thus, to vary our mode of artistic appeal, the reader of such a fine 
biography as Ron Chernow’s Alexander Hamilton22 will assuredly come to have 
much better understanding of this man than can be gleaned from superficial 
historical facts concerning him; but I would not suppose that it would help 
one to predict, or retrodict even, Hamilton’s actions in a difficult case. Charac-
ter is not a terribly good predictor—not because it is ineffectual, but because 
it is effected (and affected) in such complicated ways. What is the “predictive 
value” of a Rembrandt?
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One last point in this connection, it is helpful to remember that character 
terms bear much in common with such impolite and obviously unscientific 
terms of opprobrium as “schmuck” or “bastard.” There will be occasions when 
these are quite the correct terms to characterize what someone has done—as 
in “You say he did that? What a bastard!”—so it is not as though just ‘anything 
goes’ with their use in moral contexts. Still, it must be said that their applica-
tion is more an art than any part of a science.
hanna’s Question
So far, our preoccupation has been with the loose, the unscientific—but not 
for that the unimportant—nature of character attributions and their connec-
tion to past and future. At this point, however, the situationist may raise a 
useful objection. ‘I could almost agree with what you say concerning the inde-
pendence, and the limited dependence, of situational evaluation on how well 
or badly an individual has done in other situations. I do not agree, however, 
if this is your position, that how well other agents would do in a given type of 
situation is irrelevant to the evaluation of a given agent. Learning how well 
most people function in Milgram experiments can and arguably should affect 
our judgments of blameworthiness.’
I feel the force of this concern, and add a reference of my own. As an admirer 
in general of contemporary cinema and of Kate Winslet in particular, I am 
reminded of the former concentration camp guard, Hanna’s, question in the 
film, The Reader: confronted with her own crime of not unlocking the inmates 
caught in the burning church, she asks her main accuser, the presiding judge: 
“What would you have done?” There is no answer.
Again, following our usual practice, we will distinguish two different views 
on the relevance of what others have done or would do, in a given situation:
In a spirit of Tolstoyan—now become Kantian—boldness, it might be 
urged that we are free, guided only by reason and a sense of what is possible, to 
set the bar as high as we like, whatever empirical evidences indicates regarding 
‘normal performance.’ (Even in golf, par is not set by the average number of 
strokes on a hole.) Thus, the judge might have informed Hanna: ‘I would hope 
that I wouldn’t have acted as you did, but if I did act in that way, then I must 
be judged guilty.’
The Humean is able to craft a more nuanced position. If we are talking 
somewhat superficially about kinds of action, I will agree that one’s estima-
tion of how bad (or good) a given kind is, would take into account what the 
norm would be regarding its performance. But that is not the same thing as 
the question of how a given agent would properly be evaluated—more fully, in 
more detail—if he were to do a given act. In the case of keeping the prisoners 
locked up, if the judge were to have done it, this would have quite a different 
moral significance than Hanna’s act. Basically, the more we keep of the judge’s 
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present moral make- up, knowledge, and sophistication—the worse becomes 
his offense, the more it becomes an expression of sheer cowardice. As to the 
Milgram case, the Humean might say this: the behavior of others will to a 
point help us to understand what a given agent does, but so far as excusing, or 
even just diminishing the moral badness of, that behavior is concerned—this 
is neither necessary nor sufficient. The more deeply we understand, the more 
deeply we penetrate into the motives and moral personality of a given agent, 
the less we should need to rely on the inevitably different story concerning 
others.
Finally, by way of comparison, we turn to a situationism- influenced ethicist 
who has worked out in some detail a conception not only of moral charac-
ter but of moral responsibility: John Doris (2002). Helpfully, Doris begins his 
account of responsibility by distinguishing the “intensity” and “frequency” 
aspects of a possible excusing condition, noting that even if we can isolate a 
certain situational variable as causally salient, this does not mean that it pos-
sesses the kind of intensity—the quality of being “difficult to resist”—which 
ought to excuse (p. 135). Still, he points to the fact that situationist research 
may uncover certain “unobtrusive high- intensity stimuli” that seemingly do 
exert a decisive effect on behavior and thus bid fair to be counted as “unde-
tected excusing conditions” (p. 136). Doris addresses this possibility as, first, a 
worry concerning “normative competence”: our capacity to recognize, reason, 
and act on morally relevant features of one’s situation. Ultimately, though, it 
becomes a problem concerning “identification”: insofar as these variables are 
hidden, we do not identify with them, thus, seemingly, cannot be held respon-
sible for acting upon them (p. 140).
This, if it had been Doris’s conclusion, would have been clear, illuminating, 
and fairly radical in the extent to which it upsets our common sense, folk psy-
chological notions of responsibility. Doris, however, elects not to go this route. 
Instead, he argues that even if one is unaware of a situational factor, it may 
be possible to work up a “narrative” (pp. 142–143) underlying one’s action 
with which one plausibly would identify. Thus, Doris maintains that, in the 
Darley and Batson, “Good Samaritan”—in which those who were late tended 
not to stop to help a man apparently in distress—“even where a person fails 
to identify with the callousness that resulted from haste, he might yet embrace 
having the sort of packed schedule that induces haste” (p. 144). We may, in 
other words, find grounds for holding him responsible (morally blamewor-
thy) after all.
I find it most interesting, then, that Doris’s bold naturalism when the topic 
is “virtue ethics” turns into a cautious conservatism when it comes to offering 
widespread exemption from moral responsibility. (This is not an unusual com-
bination in the history of moral philosophy: attacking the received grounds 
for moral responsibility, but feeling pressed in the end to supply replacement 
grounds of one’s own.) Doris has in any case worked his way around—as he 
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may choose—to either the Kantian or the Humean position. One may find in 
the story of Hanna’s life times enough of a humanitarian narrative for her to 
identify with—so that she may be held to quite a high moral standard. There 
will also, however, be competing narratives, running closer to the motivations 
actually at work in this case, whose effect would be exculpatory. In the end, the 
choice simply lies with us (including the judge) as moral observers. We would 
like assistance from social science—or religion, or philosophy, or something—
but it is not clear that anything altogether helpful is available.
An Irenic Approach, Initially
In his contribution to the present volume, Mark Alfano has offered what seems 
initially a peaceable approach to these situationist wars, an analytical frame-
work with respect to which various approaches (including but by no means 
limited to his own) can be represented. On this view, we characterize ‘moral 
character traits’ as a kind of theoretical entity able to satisfy various types, and 
combinations of types, of open sentences. These sentences will collect some 
of the more important truths, or putative truths (“platitudes”) concerning 
a given trait of moral character. Interestingly, it will treat not only charac-
ter terms (‘courage,’ ‘moral character,’ etc.), but “persons” as theoretical terms, 
implicitly defined by the theory.
Now, as a device, this seems a fair and neutral way of representing certain 
possible views of moral character; but of course controversial claims may be, 
as Alfano points out, built into it one or another selection of platitudes. So, 
for instance, the claim that “if a person has courage, then she will typically 
be unaffected by situational factors that are neither reasons for nor reasons 
against overcoming a threat”; coupled with the claim that “many people have 
courage” would be, for some situationists, “fighting words.” But let me focus 
on two aspects of particular relevance to the foregoing discussion.
First, the notion of “sufficient reasons” figures in a very prominent way in 
these partial characterizations. Thus, it is said that a courageous person will 
act in certain ways, will feel certain things, will be unaffected by situational 
factors—all when there is “sufficient reason” for this. But apply this back to 
the case of Hanna: Is the situation that one is a concentration camp guard a 
sufficient reason to omit what would otherwise count as simple kindness and 
benevolence, etc.? If our notion of sufficiency is sharply Kantian (“of course 
she had sufficient reason to help”), many, even most, people will ultimately 
prove unkind and not very benevolent. If it is not, we will get a different ver-
dict. In short, the notion of ‘sufficient reason,’ as it figures in these collections, 
threatens but to recapitulate the most troubling aspects of cases like Hanna’s 
(or the Milgram subjects’).
Second, there seems one notable difference between the Lewis and Alfano 
projects. In Lewis’s case, the interesting development is that, for all the different 
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things believed about these inner states, it turns out (arguably) that they are 
brain states. What, comparably, may we discover through Ramsification con-
cerning what moral character turns out to be? Nothing equally surprising or 
exciting, some may think—but Alfano, I think, would disagree. According to 
his particular conception of moral character, at least, it turns out that what 
realizes the relevant Ramsey sentence includes things not going on solely 
“inside the person who has the virtue” (p. 225).
This, it could be supposed, is both surprising and exciting, but I remain a 
bit skeptical. Here we must distinguish the full reference of our theory of char-
acter, which may include all sorts of things (persons, states of persons, features 
of the environment, situations, and so forth), and what is referred to by such 
discourse as “my courage” or “her patience”—or what Alfano himself, in the 
passage just quoted, speaks of as the person “who has” a given virtue. I am not 
sure that Alfano is altogether clear in his way of putting this matter. He will say, 
at the very end (p. 226), that according to some very good social psychology, 
“being virtuous” does not “inhere entirely within the agent” (again “the agent 
that has that virtue”). This strikes me as either a truism (that the full range of 
what must be the case in order to “have a virtue” will include much that is out-
side of oneself)—or what hardly seems a truism, or true at all, that when Jones 
is praised for her courage (the courage she “has”), she is being praised for 
something which is located all over the place (including wherever those people 
or situations that have helped to encourage this behavior are located). Perhaps 
Alfano will say that we cannot properly make this distinction (between the full 
reference of the theory and what things like “Jones’s courage” pick out); he 
might say that this is like asking what the relation is between the reference of 
Lewis’s Ramsification (brain states) and what we meant to refer to in our old 
folk psychological talk. I will in any case return later to this important topic: 
the relation between moral praise for courage and what social science may 
teach us about such qualities.
Virtue prevalence and Social Construction
I turn, first, to another important concern of Alfano’s, which has been to 
emphasize the price to be paid for giving up, as some character theorists wish 
to do, “virtue prevalence”—that is, the thesis that virtues are quite widespread 
throughout the moral community, and are not merely the possession of a few 
moral heroes. Along these lines, Alfano seizes on a point of Philippa Foot, 
who makes much of the virtues as being qualities that we “need” as much as 
the deer needs speed or the bee its stinger. He observes, ironically, that if the 
virtues were both this necessary and as rare as some suggest, “one would have 
thought that our species would have died out long ago” (p. 224).
I hold no particular brief for Foot, but would simply draw an analogy 
here between situationist findings concerning the non- prevalence of virtue, 
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and discouraging test results concerning American students in science and 
mathematics. Of course, the latter hardly show that the skills measured by 
such tests are not important. Likewise, it could be argued, virtue  ethicists 
are entitled to hold that the virtues (and especially the vices) remain impor-
tant despite the discouraging test results of social science. An ethics of 
virtue does not hold that we will “test well” for these, so much as that if we 
do not, this is  important—and disturbing. Thus, concern over Milgram’s 
results, like concern with standardized test results, shows how important we 
take the virtues and vices to be. Moreover, to extend the analogy, we need 
not deny that these qualities—be they moral, mathematical, or scientific—
are broadly necessary for “survival”—but of course we cannot maintain in 
either case that, at their current, admittedly low levels, we are faced with 
imminent extinction. Luckily, speed in mathematics is not quite as impor-
tant for us as speed of foot is for the deer. For that matter, “obedience to 
authority” may have, or have had, (pace Milgram) greater survival value 
than “moral independence.”
To continue the previous thought, it seems evident that certain kinds and 
levels of virtue are required for—call it, “social solidarity” but that these may 
not agree with qualities morally sensitive people praise and claim to value. 
Again, it may be that getting to one’s assigned place on time has greater sur-
vival value than helping strangers (who may be planning an ambush). It may 
be that the limitations social scientists have uncovered in our moral characters 
are actually evolutionary virtues of sorts.
“Fair enough,” Alfano may say, “I have just the conception you need for 
your ‘social solidarity’ and it is my ‘social construction’ conception you took 
swipe at earlier.” In fact, that previous discussion notwithstanding, I will 
agree—partly. It may well be that what survival demands are more or less the 
very qualities good social science picks out as highly prevalent. Now, his social 
construction view Alfano describes in these terms:
What it takes (among other things) for you to be, for instance, open- 
minded . . . is that others think of you as open- minded and signal those 
thoughts to you. When they do, they prompt you to revise your self- 
concept, to want to live up to their expectations, to expect them to reward 
open- mindedness and punish closed- mindedness, and so on. These are 
all inducements to think in an open- minded way, which they will typi-
cally notice. When they do, their initial attribution will be corroborated, 
leading them to strengthen their commitment to it, and perhaps to sig-
nal that strengthening to you . . . Such feedback loops are, on my view, 
partly constitutive of what it means to have a virtue.
I would like to probe two areas of possible difficulty for such a view, the 
second of which will take us back to the main theme of my discussion.
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First, there are important questions concerning the vices. Are these, too, 
socially induced by the same kind of feedback loops? Or do they mark, to 
the contrary, merely failed (positive) loops? It is, let me say in passing, char-
acteristic of the literature on situationism that questions of the virtues, their 
consistency, and prevalence entirely dominate questions of vice (their con-
sistency and prevalence)—which in a way is strange, inasmuch as questions 
of blame, not praise, dominate whole other areas of moral philosophy. Now, 
for his part, Alfano refers to the fact that “social scientists think that people 
are quick to attribute virtues”; but this tendency would surely suggest that 
we are quick, perhaps even quicker, to attribute vices. If that is correct, we 
have some fairly substantial grounds for thinking of the vices as, in great 
part, acquired via the same social influences as generate, and partly consti-
tute, the virtues. The danger for Alfano, I submit, is now the very distinction 
between virtue and vice, good and bad, looks to be entirely external to the 
theory—almost as though it were an afterthought. Of course, this problem 
does not arise—not in such an acute way—if we think of the vices accord-
ing to the other suggestion (as failed virtues); but now we seem to be going 
against the grain of what social science is telling us concerning the acquisi-
tion of all qualities (good and bad); moreover, there is also the question of 
whether, or how, the mere failure of a “feedback loop” would be morally 
blameworthy.
Second, and most importantly, there is the issue with which we began: 
Aristotle’s formative claim that we are to be praised and blamed primarily 
for our virtues and vices. The issue becomes this. If we follow social science, 
we will arrive at a variety of conceptions, one of which is Alfano’s ‘social con-
struction’ view. To extend my earlier comparison, these conceptions would be 
like attempts to redefine (“dumb down”) mathematical and scientific skills in 
such a way that it turns out that most children do have these to a satisfactory 
degree after all (much relief all around!). However, just as rethinking mathe-
matical ability does not make anyone better at solving mathematics problems, 
redefinitions of ‘virtue’ do not actually make any one morally better—just 
ask someone who is lying along the road, waiting for a Good Samaritan to 
come along.
But I want to be fair to the social sciences: let us allow that when I refer to 
courage, I may in some sense be referring to a trait whose nature is such as to 
be characteristically induced by certain types of social cues, expectations, and 
feedback loops of the sort Alfano describes. Again, though, the fundamen-
tal limitation of this conception is that there is nothing terribly praiseworthy 
about responding to such social indicators—not as such. Rather, one must 
suppose that the praiseworthiness of courage lies in the fact that sometimes it 
is very difficult to respond to such indicators (think of the soldiers compris-
ing “The Charge of the Light Brigade”). If you like, sometimes it takes real 
courage to exhibit this kind of “social courage.” Likewise, real generosity and 
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helpfulness would begin where socially cued generosity and helpfulness leave 
off. By the same token, the former would be rare; the latter, prevalent.
So, in the end, we can have our cake and eat it too—just so long as we 
do not confuse those parts of it that are real, and rare, from those parts that 
are mass produced. We can frame, as Mark Alfano is doing, a sophisticated 
philosophical notion, drawn from social science research. We can also reflect 
on what is genuinely praiseworthy and genuinely blameworthy; but this, I 
want to say, will carry us beyond questions of social science, evolution, and 
survival.
Socrates’ Unanswered Question
“Thou shalt not sit/with statisticians nor commit/A social science,” warned 
a noted poet.23 We will adopt a somewhat more forgiving stance. There is 
certainly a role for the social and biological sciences in understanding moral 
character and morality generally. The giants of our subject—Aristotle, Kant, 
Mill—have generally kept clear of explaining moral conduct (sociologically, 
psychologically, biologically), recognizing that explaining it would run the 
extreme risk of explaining it away. There is another way of putting these mat-
ters, which hearkens back to what I said at the outset. We would like the most 
important things to be studied in the best of ways. Science has proven itself 
to be the best, so we would like to study moral character and responsibility 
scientifically. We would like what is most important to us to be very clear to us. 
All the same, Socrates’ question—what am I doing here (in prison)?—seems 
no more answerable by today’s than by the sciences of his day. If its answer 
is clear (to him), answers to comparable questions (including Hanna’s) are 
anything but.
Study Questions
1. Is someone’s character better revealed by how they live their life in ordi-
nary circumstances or how they respond to extraordinary circumstances?
2. Arguably, Aristotle thought that friendship was “extended” in the way 
Alfano says all virtues are extended. Do you think virtues such as trust-
worthiness are extended? Explain.
3. How well would you need to know someone to be able to paint a 
Humean picture of their character? How many people do you know that 
well (including yourself)? Would it be a problem if we never knew each 
other or ourselves this well?
4. What does Alfano mean by saying that “the bearers of someone’s moral 
and intellectual virtues sometimes include asocial aspects of the envi-
ronment and (more frequently) other people’s normative and descrip-
tive expectations”?
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5. Ethical naturalism is endorsed by some of the authors in this volume, 
especially Snow, Russell, Miller, and Alfano; it’s rejected by others, espe-
cially Montmarquet. What’s the best argument in favor of ethical natu-
ralism? What’s the best argument against it?
6. How would Alfano likely address Montmarquet’s worry that in explain-
ing moral character and responsibility in ways suggested by the social 
sciences, we run the risk of explaining them away?
Notes
 1.  Nathan is also using an extended metaphor. My point is clear nevertheless.
 2.  An alternative is the “psycho- functionalist” method, which disregards common sense in 
favor of (solely) highly corroborated scientific claims. See Kim (2011) for an overview. For 
my purposes, psycho- functionalism is less appropriate, since (among other things) it is more 
in danger of changing the topic.
 3.  See, for instance, Zagzebski (1996, p. 112): “It does count against a person’s virtue, however, 
if stractions or persuasions lead him to fail to exercise it.”
 4.  I seem to be in disagreement on this point with Christian Miller (this volume), who wor-
ries that people may not be motivated to be or become virtuous. In general, I’m even more 
 skeptical than Miller about the prospects of virtue theory, but in this case I find myself 
 playing the part of the optimist.
 5.  I am here indebted to Gideon Rosen.
 6.  It might also be possible to circumvent this difficulty, which anyway troubles Lewis’s applica-
tion of Ramsification to the mind- brain identity theory, by using only de re formulations of 
the relevant statements. See Fitting and Mendelsohn (1999) for a discussion of how to do so.
 7.  Experimental philosophers have started to fill this gap, but not in any systematic or 
consensus- based way.
 8.  Micah Lott (personal communication) has told me that he endorses this claim, though he 
has a related worry. In short, his concern is to explain how, given the alleged rarity of virtue, 
most people manage to live decent enough lives.
 9.  For an overview of the varieties of externalism, see Carter et al. (forthcoming).
10.  I spell out this view in more detail in Alfano (forthcoming a) and Alfano and Skorburg 
(forthcoming). For a treatment of the feedback- loops model in the context of the extended 
mind rather than the character debate, see Palermos (forthcoming).
11.  I am grateful to J. Adam Carter, Orestis Palermos, and Micah Lott for comments on a draft 
of this chapter.
12.  See mainly (Alfano 2013a), especially his description of his approach to ethics involving rea-
soning in an “abductive” way (p. 5) from scientific findings to what must be the case, philo-
sophically, for those to be true. This general viewpoint informs his treatment of epistemic 
character in (Alfano 2012).
13.  For important discussion of these results (and defense of what has come to be called the situ-
ationist viewpoint regarding moral character), see Harman (1999, 2000) and Doris (1998), 
but especially Doris’s extended and extraordinarily valuable treatment of these issues in Lack 
of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior (2002).
14.  Among the best known of these are, respectively, the work of Isen and Levin (1972)—in 
which the remarkable effects of a found dime on helping behavior are demonstrated; Darley 
and Batson (1973)—in which the effects of ‘being in a hurry because late’ on Good Samari-
tan behavior are presented, and, finally, the famous Milgram (1974) experiments concerning 
obedience to authority.
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15.  Most commonly cited here would be Hartshorne and May (1928), in which it was shown 
how the likelihood of dishonesty or cheating among school children tended to vary, for any 
given individual, considerably from situation to situation.
16.  See, for example, Kupperman (2001), Sreenivasan (2002), Montmarquet (2003), Kamtekar 
(2004), Sabini and Silver (2005), and Adams (2006).
17.  Stephen Crane (New York: Dover, 1990).
18.  In Great Short Works of Tolstoy (New York: Harper and Row, 1967).
19.  Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. II, Section II.
20.  For Hume (1975/2007, 8.10), the “uniformity of human action” must take account of the 
“diversity of characters, prejudices, and opinions.” Here he adds, tellingly, that even if an 
action occurred with “no regular connection to any known motive”—this would provoke no 
very clear or definite judgment from the observer—except wonder.
21.  Also in Great Short Works of Tolstoy.
22.  (New York: Penguin, 2005).
23.  W. H. Auden in Under Which Lyre: A Reactionary Tract for the Times.
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